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RETRIBUTION OR REHABILITATION? THE
ADDICT EXCEPTION AND MANDATORY
SENTENCING AFTER GRANT v.
UNITED STATES AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT OF 1986
"The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any
country."' When courts sentence criminal offenders, sanctions imposed on
behalf of the community generally express a combination of public safety
priorities: exaction of retribution for criminal conduct, deterrence of future
criminal acts, removal of the offender from society for the period of incarceration, and rehabilitation of the individual willing to commit crime.2 Until
recently, the dominant criminal sentencing model emphasized the last concern, reflecting a view that the ideal solution to crime was to "cure" defects
which led offenders to commit prohibited acts.3 Judges sentenced convicts
to wholly indeterminate prison terms, with the understanding that release
would occur when corrections officials determined that the offender exhibited signs of successful "rehabilitation." 4
But when crime burgeons, public perceptions of a criminal element seemingly beyond control, coupled with tangible fear in the community, "pro1. Sir Winston Churchill, quoted in Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1 (1972).

2. M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:

LAW WITHOUT ORDER

106 (1973).

3. See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1362, 1365-66 & n.10 (1975).

4. See Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904, 915-17 (1962); see also SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMITTEE, INITIAL REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES
FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA viii (Feb. 1987); Simonelli, Tak-

ing the Gamble Out of D.C. Sentencing.- The Impact of New Studies, 7 DISTRICT LAW. 27-29
(Sept.-Oct. 1982). In contrast, determinate sentencing requires that the defendant serve the

full term imposed by the judge. Liman, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States

Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365 n.18 (1987). Very recent federal guidelinebased sentencing reforms prescribe determinate terms of incarceration, ensuring that similarly

situated convicts consistently serve terms of imprisonment falling within certain boundaries.
Silets & Brenner, Commentary on the PreliminaryDraft of the Sentencing Guidelines Issued by

the United States Sentencing Commission in September, 1986, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1069, 1072-73 (1986).
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duce an unbeatable combination for statutory change" in favor of sentencing
those who commit egregious crimes to mandatory minimum prison terms. 5
Sentencing of drug traffickers in the District of Columbia, in part, reflects
the more punitive philosophy.6
Since the early 1980s, a steady increase in drug crime has gripped the
District of Columbia, severely straining the resources of enforcement, judicial, and correctional institutions.7 Yet, until very recently, the city labored
5. See Glick, MandatorySentencing: The Politics of the New CriminalJustice, 43 FED.
PROBATION 3, 5 (1979). In mandatory minimum sentencing, the legislature prescribes a sentence without possibility of parole until the convict serves the minimum term. The statute
divests judges and probation officials of discretion to forego incarceration or suspend sentences
in cases falling under the provision. See Petersilia & Greenwood, MandatoryPrison Sentences:
Their ProjectedEffects on Crime and Prison Populations, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604,
605 (1978). The District of Columbia's predominantly indeterminate sentencing scheme imposes a maximum sentence, terminable by parole authorities any time after the convict serves a
specified minimum amount of time. See Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1938); see
also supra note 4. Statutes may specify the minimum period outright, as with mandatory
minimum drug distribution penalties discussed in this Comment, see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-541(c)(1) (Supp. 1987), or as a portion of the maximum sentence imposed. See id. § 24203(2). In either instance, mandatory minimum sentencing provisions do not constrain the
judge's discretion to impose the statutory maximum term, nor the probation official's capacity
to release the offender after he serves the minimum term.
District of Columbia mandatory minimum sentencing also incorporates some features of
determinate sentencing, by requiring an offender convicted of crimes punishable by a
mandatory minimum sentence to serve a fixed prison term. Under the mandatory minimum
§ 33-541(c)(1), judges and probation officials have no authority to waive incarstatutes, e.g., id.
ceration before the statutory minimum sentence has been served. Compare id. §§ 24-428 to 429 (institutional and educational "good time" credits can reduce the overall sentence length)
with id. § 24-434 ("good time" credits not available to convicts serving mandatory minimum
sentences).
6. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(1) (Supp. 1987); see also Glick, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Arrests for drug sales increased from 191 in 1979 to 5,058 in 1986. Brief for the
District of Columbia at 13, Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, No. 87-5254, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1988) (3,126 drug arrests in 1985); cf DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS AND ANALYSIS, DRUG ABUSE AND CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA 9 (1987) [hereinafter DRUG ABUSE AND CRIME] (1,842 sales arrests in 1982, rising
to 5,058 in 1986). Annual overdose fatalities climbed from 41 in 1979 to 155 in 1985. Id. at 4.
The District of Columbia Superior Court presided over approximately 500 felony criminal
jury trials in 1980. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1986) (hereinafter D.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT]. In 1985, there were 910. Id. The criminal court accepted
pleas in 1,970 felony cases in 1980, compared with 4,377 in 1985. Id. In its analysis of major
case load trends, the D.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT noted that, despite best efforts and maximum
allocation of resources, the District of Columbia court system could not accommodate all
felony case filings in 1986. Id. at 42. The D.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT primarily attributed the
huge case volume to law enforcement's efforts to combat drug trafficking through such enforcement techniques as "Operation Clean Sweep." Id. Felony drug convictions increased
nearly sixfold, from 502 in 1982 to 3,309 in 1986. DRUG ABUSE AND CRIME, supra at 13.
Prison overcrowding has reached critical proportions, raising doubts as to whether the public has the political and fiscal will to fully implement mandatory incarceration. See Inmates of
Occoquan v. Barry, 650 F. Supp. 619, 632-35 (D.D.C. 1986) (court imposed mandatory prison
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under obsolete and ineffective criminal drug statutes, which, for example,
provided identical penalties for trafficking and simple possession. s Actual
sentences served in the District of Columbia reflected wide disparity and
inconsistency among similarly situated defendants. 9 Against this backdrop,
influential commentators announced the failure of the rehabilitative ideal as
a principled basis for sentencing,' 0 provoking a firestorm of criticism of the
wholly indeterminate sentencing scheme." In 1982, District of Columbia
voters adopted a ballot initiative providing mandatory minimum sentences
for certain drug distribution offenses.' 2 Pursuant to this initiative, it is
a felony in the District of Columbia to distribute or possess with intent
to distribute any quantity of a schedule 1,13 11,14 or III"s controlled substance, or a quantity exceeding $15,000 in value of a schedule IV 16 or
population caps) order vacated, Nos. 87-5055, -5295, slip op., 34 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 1988).
The District of Columbia Government explains that "[m]uch of the rise in prison population
stems from increased drug use, arrests and prosecutions." Brief for the District of Columbia at
13, Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, No. 87-5254, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1988);
see also id. at 12 (noting a 189% increase in prison population between 1981 and 1985).
8. See REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY ON BILL

4-123,

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT OF

1981, at 5 (Apr. 8, 1981) [hereinafter UCSA REPORT] (existing drug laws in the District failed
to relate the seriousness of the offense to the penalties imposed).
9. Simonelli, Taking the Gamble Out of D.C. Sentencing: The Impact of New Studies, 7
DISTRICT LAW. 27, 29 (Sept.-Oct. 1982) (citing study concluding that lack of legislative guidance and latitude permitted to D.C. judges fosters sentencing variation; judges sentence in
accordance with any philosophy or goal).

10. See, e.g., F.

ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

25-41 (1964).

11. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 88 (Despite its superficial appeal, indeterminate
sentencing, with its inherent uncertainty, "has produced more cruelty and injustice than the
benefit its supporters envisage.").
12. Initiative No. 9, District of Columbia Mandatory Minimum Sentences Initiative of
1981, § 10, 30 D.C. Reg. 1082, 1085-87 (Mar. 11, 1983) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-541(c)(1) (Supp. 1987)) (mandatory drug offense penalties).
13. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-513 to -514 (Supp. 1987). Under the District's drug laws, the
Mayor may place a substance on schedule I if it has a high potential for abuse and no safe
accepted medical use. Examples of schedule I drugs include heroin, and nonnarcotic hallucinogens such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and peyote. Id.
14. Id. §§ 33-515 to -516. Schedule II controlled substances include those with a high
potential for abuse, a currently accepted medical use (although with severe restrictions), abuse
of which may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. The statute places cocaine,
amphetamine, phenmetrazine (preludin), certain barbiturates, methaqualone (quaalude), and
phencyclidine (PCP) on schedule II. Id.
15. Id. §§ 33-517 to -518. Schedule III controlled substances have less potential for abuse
than those in schedule I and II, a currently accepted medical use, and a moderate or low
potential for physical or high psychological dependence. Examples include pharmaceutical
preparations and compounds containing the narcotic drug codeine. Id.
16. Id. §§ 33-519 to -520. Schedule IV covers certain prescription drugs with a recognized potential for abuse, such as diazepam (valium). These drugs are regarded as those with a
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V 7 substance. '8 A single count of any of these felonies carries a mandatory
minimum sentence. 19
Although mandatory minimum sentencing seeks to punish and deter drug
traffickers willing to accept the risk of incarceration for the certainty of profits, its harshness may be inappropriate for certain offenders. Recognizing
this fact, the District of Columbia sentencing initiative provided an "addict
exemption," which granted judges discretion to waive prison terms for offenders who were addicts at the time of the offense, had no prior distribution
convictions, and sold drugs primarily to support their addiction. 2" This initiative recognized that many drug dealers accept the risk of incarceration to
support their addictions, rather than to attain profits. The addict exemption
granted limited judicial discretion to forego incarceration within a sentencing scheme evincing a societal desire for certain imprisonment of convicted
drug dealers. However, the voter-adopted exemption lacked legislative guidance on key matters. Judges faced an inadequate operative definition of
"addict," a lack of procedures for determining eligibility, and uncertainty
surrounding the proper disposition of an offender once the court reached a
finding of eligibility. In sum, substantial ambiguity as to the extent of a
judge's authority to circumvent public demand for mandatory sentencing by
means of the addict exemption existed. The past two years have marked
significant developments toward resolution of these inherent difficulties in
implementation by the courts. In 1986, the District of Columbia Council
expressly expanded eligibility under the addict exception to habitual users of
cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), and phenmetrazine (preludin).
This Comment first will explore the unique history and origin of the District of Columbia addict exemption, beginning with comprehensive drug law
reform in 1981. The adoption of mandatory minimum sentences by voter
initiative over the objections of a majority of the District of Columbia Council and prosecutorial officials will be surveyed, as will problems in construction and application arising due to a lack of formal legislative history. The
Comment will then examine the efforts of District of Columbia courts to
determine the extent of their ability to circumvent the mandate of
mandatory sentencing within the addict exemption's limited grant of discremedical use, a relatively low potential for abuse, but which may lead to limited physical or
psychological dependence relative to the drugs on higher schedules. Id.
17. Id. §§ 33-522 to -523. Schedule V identifies those drugs with a low potential for
abuse, a currently accepted medical use and a limited potential for dependence relative to
drugs on other schedules. Schedule V includes cannabis and preparations containing low active doses of opium, morphine, and codeine. Id.

18. Id. § 33-541.
19. See id. § 33-541(c)(1)(A), (B), (C).
20. See id. § 33-541(c)(2).
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tion, and to resolve procedural and constitutional issues raised by ambiguities in the original initiative. The Comment will next analyze the 1986
council amendment, and the potential impact of its expansion of eligibility
on mandatory sentencing. While the council's message as to the purpose of
felony drug sentencing is still far from clear, the courts have adopted intrajudicial measures to rectify imprecision in eligibility criteria, reduce arbitrary sentencing, and implement a public mandate for punishment of drug
traffickers within the confines of the addict exemption's limited grant of judicial discretion to waive incarceration. The Comment will conclude, however, that neither the strict punitive sentencing model exemplified by
mandatory minimum sentencing, nor a model emphasizing rehabilitation,
well represented by the addict exception, nor any combination thereof, will
effectively reduce drug crime absent a political and fiscal commitment of
resources needed to provide sufficient facilities to keep pace with the volume
of drug cases in the District of Columbia courts.
I.

ORIGINS OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE ADDICT EXEMPTION
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A.

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act

Until 1979, when Congress transferred primary legislative jurisdiction
over criminal statutes to the Council of the District of Columbia, 2' that body
lacked legislative authority to enact sorely-needed criminal law revisions.
Cognizant of the need for reform, in 1978, a congressionally created commission developed a comprehensive criminal code reform proposal. 22 Between 1978 and 1980, the District of Columbia Committee on the Judiciary
considered and rejected the commission's proposal. 23 Ultimately, the Committee focused on areas of utmost community concern. Revision of the District's drug laws ranked high among the Judiciary Committee's priorities.2 4
The District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981
(UCSA) 2 5 represented the Judiciary Committee's comprehensive overhaul of
drug laws in the District of Columbia. The Committee intended to bring
criminal statutes relating to drug offenses into conformity with federal law
and the laws of other states modeled on the proposal of the National Confer21. See Clarke & Meister, Cutting Crime: A Guide to Proposed D.C. Crime Reform, 6
DISTRICT LAW. 26, 27 (Sept.-Oct. 1981).
22. Id.

23. Id. at 28.
24. Id; see also UCSA REPORT, supra note 8.

25. The District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981, 28 D.C. Reg.
3081 (1981) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-501 to -567 (Supp. 1987)).
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ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 26 The UCSA classified con-

trolled substances into five schedules according to relative potential
danger.27
In response to the leniency of previous drug laws, the Act established a
range of offenses and penalties for drug crimes involving the various categories of controlled substances. 2' The UCSA punished simple possession as a
misdemeanor, regardless of the nature of the drug involved. 29 The UCSA
provided felony sanctions for even a single act of distribution, manufacture,
or possession with intent to distribute, of substances in schedules I, II, and
III, and for quantities of schedules IV and V substances exceeding $15,000
in value. 3' Generally, the UCSA attempted to grade prescribed penalties
according to the nature of the offense and the schedule of the substance involved. 3 ' Its sentencing provisions set only the maximum allowable term.3 2
During full council consideration of the UCSA, Councilmember John
Ray, an advocate of mandatory minimum sentencing for serious drug offenses, strongly criticized the discretionary approach as unresponsive to the
pressing drug crisis facing the community.3 3 In May, 1981, during the first
reading of the measure in full council, he presented amendments designed to
restrict judicial discretion in sentencing drug dealers.3 4 Councilmember Ray
argued that the penalties provided in the UCSA did not represent a mean26. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Former statutes classified controlled substances
either as "narcotic drugs," see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-401 to -425 (1973), or "dangerous
drugs," defined as substances which have habit forming, excessively stimulating, or dangerously toxic effects. See id. § 33-701(1). This cumbersome classification system excluded substances which had a high potential for abuse, but which did not readily fit into either major
category. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4. For example, under this system, LSD, PCP,
and quaalude were not brought under the control of District drug statutes until late 1974. Id.
at 2.
27. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 4. The Act gave the Mayor administrative authority
to place emergent dangerous drugs on a controlled substance schedule. Id; see also supra
notes 13-17 (describing scheduling criteria).
28. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 5-7; see also District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Act, §§ 401-10, 28 D.C. Reg. 3081, 3102-08 (1981) (codified as amended at
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-541 to -549 (Supp. 1987)).
29. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 6; Clarke & Meister, supra note 21, at 29.
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(1) (Supp. 1987); UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
31. UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
32. District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Act, §§ 401-10, 28 D.C. Reg.
3081, 3102-08 (1981) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-541 to -549 (Supp.
1987)). The original UCSA penalty structure corresponded with the District of Columbia's
indeterminate sentencing scheme, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-203 (1981), thereby affording
judges and probation officials considerable discretion to shorten or forego prison sentences.
See supra notes 3-4.
33. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL 71-73
(May 5, 1981) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 5, 1981].
34. Id. at 66.
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ingful deterrent to calculating dealers responsible for hazardous drug
crime.3 5 He emphasized that his proposed minimums would deter major
suppliers motivated by profit rather than addicts who supported their habits
36

by selling drugs.

Many influential officials, however, opposed the mandatory minimum sentencing model. In particular, those familiar with the day-to-day realities of
administering criminal justice hoped to avoid inroads on judicial discretion.37 During council hearings on that issue, Charles F.C. Ruff, then
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, spoke against
mandatory minimum sentences for armed offenders.3" Mr. Ruff expressed
concern over the value of divesting those in the justice system of the ability
to tailor punishment to the circumstances of special cases where the possibility of rehabilitation existed. 9 Council Chairman Arrington Dixon echoed
these concerns in debate on the proposed amendments to the Controlled
Substances Act. Focusing on the legislation's relatively severe maximum
penalties, he emphasized that the judiciary had flexibility to mete out harsh
35. Id. at 70-71. Chief of Police Burtell Jefferson joined Councilmember Ray in his criticism of the bill: He considered "mandatory minimums for distributing and/or selling controlled substances ... a necessary part" of "get tough" measures to combat drug crime, an
approach which the Committee bill purported to espouse, but in the Chief's opinion, did not
deliver. Letter from Burtell M. Jefferson, Chief of Police, to Councilmember John Ray (May
14, 1981).
36. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL 37-39

(May 19, 1981) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 19, 1981].

37. See Clarke & Meister, supra note 21, at 31-32. In the Spring of 1981, The council
conducted public hearings on comprehensive criminal law reform, including mandatory sentencing measures for armed felony offenders, generating many critical comments. Id at 28; see
also, e.g., Statement of the Citizen's Advisory Committee of the District of Columbia Bar on
Public Hearings of the Council on Criminal Code Reform, at 2-3 (Apr. 17, 1981) (mandatory
armed offender sentencing bills dangerous and ill-conceived: District of Columbia incarceration rate already highest in nation; in places where it exists, mandatory sentencing failed to
deter violent crime); Statement of District of Columbia Executive Branch Agencies on the Bills
to Expand and Amend the D.C. Criminal Code, Comments on Bill 4-120, District of Columbia Sentencing Improvements Act of 1981, at 3 (Mar. 12, 1981) (favoring broad judicial discretion to render a sentence appropriate for circumstances of the offender); Statement of the
National Conference of Black Lawyers on Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Armed Offenders: Bill Nos. 4-109 and 4-111, at 2-3 (sentencing function best served by trained judges, not
mandatory penalties, eliminates incentive to plea bargain, promotes litigation which would
break the back of the judicial system); Statement of Jane Seigler of Behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area on Proposed Sentencing Statutes, at 7-10
(expressing disfavor with mandatory sentencing: judges stripped of discretion to consider mitigating circumstances, approach does not demonstrably reduce crime, and limits prosecutorial
flexibility).
38. Statement of Charles F.C. Ruff, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
Before the Judiciary Committee, Council of the District of Columbia 27-29 (Mar. 11, 1981).
39. Id. at 28.
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punishment to those most deserving it.'
Judiciary Committee Chairman David Clarke, who crafted the UCSA,
emphasized that, just as the offenses defined in the legislation encompassed a
range of conduct, the penalties provided a range of punishment.4 He asserted that the UCSA's prescribed maximum penalties logically targeted
egregious conduct.4 2 In contrast, Councilmember Ray's statutory minimum
penalties would necessarily affect less serious offenders, to whom the maximum sentences should not apply.4 3 Mr. Clarke noted that this feature of the
mandatory penalties ultimately would affect disproportionately the smalltime courier, often an addict, who "held" drugs on behalf of a larger scale
distributor, rather than achieving the desired effect of eliminating major
source dealers.' Finally, Mr. Clarke observed, the District already incarcerated more individuals per capita than any state in the nation, casting serious doubt upon the need for mandatory prison sentences. 4 After lengthy
debate, the council rejected the Ray amendments.4 6
Councilmember Ray again offered a package of mandatory minimum sentencing amendments at the May 19 final reading.4 7 This time, he tempered
the punitive sentencing proposal with special provisions under which narcotics addicts could avoid mandatory prison sentences. 48 Amendment nine expressly granted discretion to judges to waive the proposed mandatory
penalties in cases whereoffenders convicted of distribution could prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they had an addiction to narcotics at the
40. PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 19, 1981, supra note 36, at 39-42.

41. Id. at 45.
42. Id. at 45-47.
43. Id. Mr. Clarke posited a hypothetical situation in which one person gratuitously
handed a controlled substance to another, such as a husband giving a wife a sleeping pill, in
illustrating the need to focus on the "other end of the spectrum of conduct." PROCEEDINGS OF
MAY 5, 1981, supra note 33, at 74-75. The Council's General Counsel opined that
Councilmember Ray's proposed amendments were technically broad enough to encompass
this innocuous scenario, exposing the husband to a mandatory prison term. See Clarke &
Meister, supra note 21, at 32. But see J. RAY, MEMORANDUM TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COUNSEL ON PROPOSED MANDATORY SENTENCING AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 2 (May 18, 1981) (offense of administering or dispensing

controlled substance not "distribution" within the meaning of the statute).
44. PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 5, 1981, supra note 33, at 79.
45. Id. at 77. In 1979, the District of Columbia's rate of imprisonment was 672.7 per
100,000, the highest in the nation. See Statement of the Citizen's Advisory Committee of the
District of Columbia Bar on Public Hearings of the Council on Criminal Code Reform, supra
note 37, at 2.
46. PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 5, 1981, supra note 33, at 113-14.
47. See J. RAY, MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COUNCIL ON BILL 4-123 (May 18, 1981).
48. PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 19, 1981, supra note 36, at 37-38.
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time of the violation.49 Once again, the council rejected the Ray amend50
ments, and adopted the UCSA with its original penalty structure intact.
II.

THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA MANDATORY-MINIMUM SENTENCING
INITIATIVE OF

1981

Rebuffed in the council, Councilmember Ray took his case for mandatory
sentencing directly to the people. On June 22, 1981, he formed the Citizens
for Safer Streets Committee for the purpose of promoting a voter initiative to
impose mandatory minimum prison terms for drug traffickers and other offenders using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 5 ' Eventually, Ray
filed sufficient signatures with the Board of Elections and Ethics to place
before the voters a ballot initiative to require judges to impose prison
felons. 5 2
sentences without parole to convicted drug dealers and armed
Charles F.C. Ruff, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
publicly disapproved of the mandatory sentencing scheme, and, in particular
the provisions of the initiative directed toward drug offenders. 53 He objected
54
to the initiative's foreclosure of both judicial and prosecutorial discretion.
Flexibility in sentencing gave prosecutors considerable bargaining power in
obtaining guilty pleas from offenders, which accounted for the disposition of
most criminal cases.5 5 If the felony drug defendant knew that the judge
could not offer leniency, and that he could expect a lengthy prison term, Mr.
Ruff argued, the defendant had nothing to lose by proceeding to a full-blown
jury trial.56 If this became standard practice in the huge number of felony
drug cases before the court, "the result, without exaggeration, would be
chaos," because the superior court is incapable of trying many more cases
49. See J.

RAY, MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COUNCIL ON BILL 4-123, attachment B, amendment 9 (May 18, 1981). Amendment 10 defined "addicts" as persons whose normal functions were so altered by the continued use of an
undefined controlled substance as to necessitate "the continued presence of said substance in
order to prevent withdrawal or abstinence syndrome." Id. at attachment C. This amendment
obviously sought to exempt from mandatory sentencing those eligible offenders who displayed
physical signs of addiction. Id.
50. D.C. Law 4-51, The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 28 D.C. Reg. 3081 (Supp.
1987).
51. News Release from the Office of Councilman John Ray (June 22, 1981); see also Councilman Wants Mandatory Sentencing On Ballot, Wash. Post, July 26, 1981, at Cl, col. 1;J.
RAY, Statement on Mandatory Prison Terms (June 22, 1981).
52. News Release from the Citizens for Safer Streets Committee (Mar. 4, 1982).
53. See Ruff, MandatoryMinimum Sentence Initiative, 7 DISTRICT LAW., 28 (Sept./Oct.
1982) [hereinafter Ruff, Mandatory Minimums]; see also Ruff, D.C. Should Say No to These
Mandatory Sentences, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1982, at A19, col. 1.
54. Ruff, Mandatory Minimums, supra note 53, at 28.

55. Id.
56. Id.
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57
than it does now.
The voters adopted the mandatory minimum sentencing initiative during
the 1982 primary election.18 Because the measure circumvented the council,
the policy debate over its predecessor never reached complex issues associated with the substantive mechanics of administering mandatory sentencing.
While the council explored at length the relative merits of mandatory sentencing, 59 it discussed and debated the addict exemption only in passing and
in general terms during consideration of Councilmember Ray's mandatory
sentencing amendments.'

A.

The "Addict Exemption" Codified and Criticized

The addict exemption, part of the mandatory sentencing initiative,6 expressly granted judicial discretion within the limited confines of mandatory
minimum sentencing. 6 2 If the judge concluded that an individual, convicted
of manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute certain
controlled substances; had no prior convictions for distributing a schedule I,
II, or III controlled substance; was an "addict" at the time of the violation;
and committed the offense for the primary purpose of obtaining a "narcotic
drug" to support his addiction, the judge could waive the mandatory minimum sentence. 63 Significantly, the initiative mandated no alternative pun57. Id.
58. Initiative Measure No. 9, District of Columbia Mandatory-Minimum Sentences Initi-

ative of 1981, 30 D.C. Reg. 1082 (1982).
59. In debate on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, David Clarke had referred to
studies indicating that New York's prototypical mandatory drug sentencing law was a failure,
placing increased strain on judicial resources with no measurable reduction in drug crime.
PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 5, 1981, supra note 33, at 77; PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 19, 1981, supra
note 36, at 47-48. On August 8, 1982, the research division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
the National Institute of Justice, issued a study concluding that New York's drug sentencing
law had resulted in a three-fold increase in trials, a commensurate rise in associated delays and
inconclusive effects on reducing drug abuse. Mandatory Sentencing Doesn't Work: Justice
Dept. Study, Los Angeles Daily J., Aug. 10, 1982, at 7, col 1. The study warned that in light of
ambiguous statistics, mandatory sentencing's promise of deterrence and incapacitation was
based more on faith than fact. Id.; see also ACLU News Release, ACLU Charges Mandatory
Sentencing Initiative Ineffective, Unjust and Costly (Mar. 31, 1982).
60. See PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 19, 1981, supra note 36, at 37-38.
61. See Initiative No. 9, District of Columbia Mandatory Minimum Sentences Initiative
of 1981, § 10, 30 D.C. Reg. 1082, 1087 (1983) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 33541(c)(2) (Supp. 1987)).
62. Finney v. United States, 527 A.2d 733, 735 (D.C. 1987) (The addict exemption only
"opens the discretionary door very slightly to permit the judge, in sentencing an addict, to
waive the mandatory minimum in certain circumstances"); accord Grant v. United States, 509
A.2d 1147, 1153 (D.C. 1986).
63. See Initiative No. 9, District of Columbia Mandatory Minimum Sentences Initiative
of 1981, § 10, 30 D.C. Reg. 1082, 1087 (1983) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 33541(c)(2) (Supp. 1987)).
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ishment. The provision left disposition of an offender who met the statutory
qualifications to the judge's discretion.
When Councilmember Ray proposed the addict exemption during consideration of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the rejected amendments
defined "addict" as a person whose continuous use of a drug so altered his
normal functions that he required further use to avoid withdrawal or abstinence syndrome. 64 The definition clearly limited the availability of the sentencing exemption to physically addicted narcotics users. The successful
measure's definition of addict differed markedly, involving two distinct
prongs.65 The first prong defined an "addict" as a person who habitually
used a narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or
welfare.6 6 The second prong identified a person addicted to a narcotic drug
to the point that he lost the power of self control over the addiction.) The
initiative adopted definitional language identical to that of the Dangerous
Drug Act (DDA),67 a District of Columbia statute establishing a program of
rehabilitative civil commitment for drug users. The reference in the DDA to
drug users expressed Congress' intent to extend rehabilitative treatment to
drug abusers who had not advanced to the stage of physical narcotics
addiction.6 8
Councilmember Ray consulted several organizations within the criminal
justice system, seeking their views and cooperation in incorporating
mandatory sentencing into the District's criminal jurisprudence. 69 The addict exemption provisions drew critical comments, which isolated a need for
clarification of eligibility criteria. The United States Attorney for the District of Columbia noted ambiguities in the provision's definition of "addict." 7 The first prong equated habitual use with addiction, thus
64. See

J. RAY, MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COUNCIL ON BILL 4-123 attachments B & C (May 18, 1981) (amendments 9 & 10).

65. See Initiative No. 9, District of Columbia Mandatory Minimum Sentences Initiative
of 1981, § 8, 30 D.C. Reg. 1082, 1085 (1983) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 33501(24) (Supp. 1987)).
66. Id. As originally adopted, the definition of "narcotics addict" for purposes of the
addict exemption read:
"Addict" means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety or welfare, or who is or has been so far
addicted to the use of such narcotic drug as to have lost the power of self-control
with reference to his addiction.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(24) (Supp. 1984).

67. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-601 to -615 (1981).
68. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(24) (Supp. 1987) with id. § 24-602 (1981).
69. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
70. See COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL 5-8
(Mar. 8, 1983) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF MARCH 8, 1983]. Invoking an emergency procedure usually reserved for District of Columbia executive officials, United States Attorney Stan-
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"telegraph[ing] to the public that the mere use of narcotic drugs is sufficient
to exempt the user from taking full responsibility for criminal conduct."'"
United States Attorney Stanley Harris recommended amending the exemption to limit its applicability to those physically addicted to narcotics.72 He
further objected to the expense and difficulty of administration of the addict
exception. In his opinion, the exemption would virtually assure that any
first offender would be able to escape mandatory sentencing.73 In a late hour
appeal for broader discretion, Mr. Harris noted that because the exemption
appeared to permit first offenders to escape mandatory prison terms, retention of judicial discretion in all first offense cases would simplify administration. 74 He advised the council to reserve mandatory minimum sentences for
offenders with prior convictions.75
United States Attorney Harris identified procedural difficulties as well.
First, allocation of the burden of proof was unclear. Mr. Harris recomley Harris, the District of Columbia's chief prosecutorial official, appeared before the Council
in special session requesting an extension in the effective date of the sentencing initiative, to
allow for development of implementation procedures. Id.
Harris spoke of the measure's profound impact on the city's criminal justice system, and of a
concerted inter-branch effort within the United States Attorney's office to meet the policy
problems posed by the sentencing mandate. Id. at 7-8. With respect to the drug provisions, he
indicated that prosecutors would experience difficulty in determining how to formulate charging decisions and discussed other effects of the initiative on prosecution strategy. Id. at 13.
The Council adopted emergency legislation extending the effective date of the sentencing initiative from March 11, 1983 to June 7, 1983. D.C. Law 5-10, 30 D.C. Reg. 1226 (1983).
71. Letter from Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to
Councilmembers Charlene Drew Jarvis and Jerry A. Moore, Jr. 3-4 (Apr. 15, 1983). Mr.
Harris made reference to the addict exemption's "two-pronged" definition of "addict." See
supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. Mr. Harris pointed out that the definitional language was identical to that used in the District of Columbia statute authorizing a rehabilitation
program for noncriminal drug users. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The "first
prong" was intended to expand eligibility for treatment under that program beyond "true"
physical addicts. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-601 (1981) (statute designed to afford an "opportunity to the drug user for rehabilitation") (emphasis added); accord Grant v. United States,
509 A.2d 1147, 1153 n.11 (D.C. 1986); Wheeler v. United States, 276 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.
1971).
72. Letter from Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to
Councilmember John Ray, supra note 71, at 3-4. Because the Initiative extended eligibility for
the sentencing waiver to persons meeting either the first or second prongs of the "addict"
definition, see supra note 66, United States Attorney Harris expressed concern over inclusion
of dealers who used narcotics as a matter of choice, and recommended eliminating the addict
definition's first prong, so that it would only apply to a trafficker who "is or has been so far
addicted to the use of a narcotic drug as to have lost the power of self control with respect to
his addiction." Letter from Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to Councilmember John Ray, supra note 71, at 4.
73. Letter from Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to
Councilmember John Ray, supra note 71, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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mended a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard, with the burden on
the defendant.7 6 He also suggested a clarifying amendment requiring judicial eligibility findings on the record, with a right for the government to
appeal such findings."' Second, because the provision inadequately set forth
the manner of determining whether the defendant was a first offender, Mr.
Harris recommended application of the provisions of section 23-111 of the
District of Columbia Code to determine whether a disqualifying prior conviction existed.7 8
An ad hoc committee of The District of Columbia Bar also found the
definition of "addict" overbroad. On its face, it could encompass a variety of
behavior short of physical addiction, making it impossible for the prosecution to rebut defense testimony as to the defendant's addiction. 79 The Committee asserted that "[e]quating drug 'addicts' with drug 'users' makes the
exception the rule, and undermines the intent of the Initiative." 8 ° The addict exemption became law with the fundamental contradiction presented by
the two prongs of the definition of addict unresolved. It set forth no procedures or standards by which the sentencing judge would determine a particular offender's addict status. Protestations that the language of the provision
made it unclear whether the measure applied to "addicts" physically addicted to narcotic drugs or mere "users" essentially went unheeded. 8'
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id. In order to impose an enhanced sentence upon a repeat offender in the District,
the prosecutor must formally bring to the judge's attention any prior convictions by filing a
recidivist information. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-11 l(a)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1985). This provision
is intended to ensure adequate notice to both the court and the defendant of potential exposure
to punishment beyond that provided by the statute. See Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d
1318, 1326 (D.C. 1982).
79. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, DIVISION V, CRIMINAL LAW AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AD Hoc SUBCOMMITTEE ON INITIATIVE No. 9, COMMENTS OF DIVISION V OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING INITIATIVE OF 1981, at 10-11 (Feb. 9, 1983).

80. Id. at 11. The Ad Hoc Subcommittee also recommended striking the first part of the
definition of "addict." Id.; cf supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
81. The textual definition of "addict" transmits essentially conflicting signals. The "first
prong" seems to encompass habitual, although voluntary, users, and the history of the language used bears out this construction. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. The
government and private bars construed the second part to cover "true" physical addicts, who
had no control over their drug habit. See supra notes 71-72, 80, and accompanying text.
Councilmember Ray responded to these concerns by noting that the definition "closely tracks
the long-accepted and workable definition used in federal proceedings," an apparent reference
to the Narcotics Addicts Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 218(a)(6), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2027,
2031 (repeal effective Nov. 1, 1986), amended by Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (repeal effective Nov. 1, 1987). See J.RAY,
MEMORANDUM TO THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, EMERGENCY AMEND-
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The absence of legislative direction as to the type of offender covered by
the exemption and the criteria and procedure for determining eligibility
raised significant issues. These questions centered upon the uncertain extent
of judicial and prosecutorial latitude to circumvent the dictates of
mandatory sentencing requirements through the exemption's limited grant
of discretion. The District of Columbia courts grappled with these questions
in a series of 1986 and 1987 cases. These cases gave considerable shape to
the skeletal language of the waiver provision, but ultimately, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals encountered certain fundamental uncertainties
in legislative intent and reasoning, necessitating further action by the
council.
III.

FILLING THE VOID: THE ADDJCT EXEMPTION IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA COURTS

A.

Giving Shape and Scope to the Addict Exemption: Development of
ProceduralRequirements

1. Determining Prior Convictions: Limits on ProsecutorialDiscretion
The "addict exemption" provision failed to set forth a procedure for the
judge to use in determining whether the defendant had any prior disqualifying convictions." United States Attorney Harris, the District's chief prosecutor, recommended incorporating a procedure used when the government
sought enhanced penalties for crimes such as repeat offenses.8 3 Under the
enhanced penalty procedure, the prosecution files a recidivist information
with the court setting forth prior convictions.8 4
In United States v. Mitchell,8 5 the defendant pleaded guilty to distribution
of heroin.8 6 Although the defendant had an extensive history of drug
crime, 87 the prosecutor did not file a recidivist information advising the
court of a prior conviction for possession of heroin with intent to distribute.8 8 The prosecutor argued, and the defendant agreed, that the government had discretion under section 23-111 of the District of Columbia Code
MENTS TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES INITIATIVE OF

1981, at 2 (May 20, 1983). Nevertheless, the degree of choice and control over a drug habit
required to bring a defendant within the scope of the addict waiver provision is still unclear.
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

83. See Letter from Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
to Councilmember John Ray, supra note 71, at 4.

84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85.

114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 1257 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 20, 1986).

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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not to make the defendant's prior convictions an issue at sentencing.8 9 Section 23-111 forbade sentencing a convicted criminal to increased punishment
by reason of prior convictions absent filing of a prosecutor's information setting forth those convictions. 90
The court held that a prosecutor's attempt to forgive a prior disqualifying
conviction, and a court's willingness to ignore it, exceeded the scope of their
discretion under the mandatory minimum sentencing initiative. 9' The court
distinguished mandatory minimums from enhanced sentences.9 2 Mandatory
minimums establish fixed penalties instead of increasing existing ones, and
93
express different policies than penalty enhancement provisions.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently validated the trial
court's reasoning in Mitchell in another similar case. In Finney v. United
States,94 the prosecutor obtained a conviction for a sale of heroin to an undercover officer. 95 The trial court refused sentencing under the addict exemption and sentenced the defendant to a mandatory four-to-twelve year
term because he had a prior conviction that disqualified him for alternative
sentencing.96 The trial judge learned of the prior disqualifying distribution
conviction through a presentence report. 97 On appeal, the defendant argued
that the prosecution's failure to inform the court of the defendant's recidivist
status allowed the judge to consider sentencing him under the addict exemption. 98 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the
defendant lacked eligibility due to the 1982 distribution conviction.9 9 Utiliz89. Id.
90. Id. at 1262; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
91. Mitchell, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 1263. The judge found that the mandatory

minimum penalty provision does not enhance penalties for drug offenses prescribed elsewhere,
but rather establishes fixed penalties itself. Id.
92. Id. at 1262. The judge considered immaterial the source of his knowledge of Mitchell's prior disqualifying conviction, stating, "[a]ccuracy matters, not pedigree."

Id; see also

supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. Mitchell, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 1263. This resolution of a procedural ambiguity

which existed since the voters adopted the initiative apparently foreclosed a coveted opportunity for the United States Attorney to exercise broad prosecutorial discretion at the sentencing
stage, as well as its traditional latitude in charging. Joseph E. DiGenova, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia called recognition of the prosecutor's control over prior conviction information a legitimate exercise of discretion in light of the Council's failure to clarify
the issue in 1983. "When there is inartful wording in the law, the people who have the responsibility for enforcing it have to give it meaning." See Plea BargainsErode Drug Law's Intent,
Wash. Post, May 12, 1986, at A22, col. 2.
94. 527 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1987).

95. Id. at 734.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also infra note 202 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 735.

99. Id. Judge Terry, writing for a unanimous panel in Finney held the prosecutor's failure
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ing the same reasoning as Mitchell, the court noted that the mandatory minimum sentencing provision did not authorize or require the court to increase
the sentence imposed, but rather mandated a fixed penalty."
The court
held that its "duty to impose the mandatory minimum cannot be affected by
10
the government's failure to file or not to file such an information." '
2. Grant v. United States: Burdens of Proof- Determining Eligibility
Perhaps the most significant case decided by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals concerning the addict exemption is Grant v. United
States.102 In Grant, the court addressed procedural uncertainties left by the
voters and Council. Grant established the prevailing procedure by which
judges now determine eligibility for sentencing under the addict exemption,
setting forth the burdens of proof and prima facie case required to invoke the
waiver.' 0 3 In Grant, the defendant pleaded guilty to distribution of
preludin. " At sentencing, he asked the court for permission to enter a drug
rehabilitation program in lieu of a mandatory sentence.'0 5 The presentence
report indicated three prior convictions for possession of marijuana, but no
disqualifying distribution offenses.'° 6 The defendant sought to introduce evidence of an addiction to narcotics at the time of the instant violation. 107
The trial judge concluded that the defendant failed to meet his burden of
proving addiction, and refused to hear testimony from him.'0" The judge
commented that the mandatory penalties sought to get drug dealers, like
Grant, off the street, not to "keep throwing good money after bad" on
rehabilitation.19 The court sentenced Grant to a mandatory minimum
to file a recidivist information "entirely irrelevant... section 23-111 does not apply to this case
because we are not here dealing with an enhanced penalty." Id.; accord Mitchell 114 Daily
Wash. L. Rep. at 1263; United States v. Tuzon, 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2025, 2028 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1985).
100. Finney, 527 A.2d at 735.
101. Id.
102. 509 A.2d 1147 (D.C. 1986).
103. Id. at 1151-56. The procedures set forth in Grant have been cited with approval in:
Finney, 527 A.2d at 734; Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 531 (D.C. 1986); United States
v. Peterkin, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2133, 2136 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1987); United
States v. Rogers, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 221, 228 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1986).
104. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1149.
105. Id. at 1149-50.
106. Id.Grant had been sentenced to supervised probation three times for the three prior
offenses. His pre-sentence report indicated that his probation was completed with "poor adjustment." Id.
107. Id.at 1150-51. The defense was prepared to produce the defendant's common law
spouse and other witnesses to present information as to his drug problem. Id.at 1150.
108. Id.at 1150. The trial judge barred any testimony from the defendant, saying that he
"wouldn't believe him." Id.
109. Id.
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term. 110
On appeal, the court set forth the three statutory elements of eligibility for
sentencing under the addict exemption: that the defendant was an addict,
who had no prior disqualifying convictions, and that the commission of the
distribution offense was for the primary purpose of supporting the defendant's habit. "' It further noted that neither the underlying controlled substances legislation nor the mandatory minimum sentencing initiative gave
any direction to the judge in making these essential findings." 2 The court
then looked to the federal Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA)," 3
which permitted sentencing of an addict offender to addiction treatment as
an alternative to incarceration. 1"4 The court held that the NARA eligibility
standards applied "[i]n the absence of any legislative directive," to determine
eligibility for the District of Columbia addict exemption." 5 The court then
set forth the burden of proof for a defendant seeking to establish prima facie
eligibility. 1 6 First, prior to the imposition of a sentence, the defendant must
request the trial judge to consider eligibility under the exemption. , " Failure
to do so would constitute a waiver. 18 Second, the defendant must offer eviThis proffer, the court
dence that he satisfies all three eligibility criteria.'
solid information
provide
and
than
conclusions,
more
stated, must contain
110. Id. The court below imposed the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not
less than 20 months and not more than five years. Id.
I11. Id. at 1151.
112. Id. at 1151 & n.3.
113. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, §§ 218(a)(6), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2027, 2031 (repeal effective Nov. 1,
1986), amended by Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, § 4, 99
Stat. 1728 (repeal effective Nov. 1, 1987).
114. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1151. Prior to its repeal in November 1987, sentencing under the
NARA itself was another discretionary option available to a sentencing judge in District of
Columbia Superior Court. See Mulky v. United States, 451 A.2d 855 (D.C. 1982); Fludd v.
United States, 336 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1975). The existence of mandatory penalties under District
of Columbia law did not preclude a judge from committing an eligible offender for drug treatment under the federal statute, making the NARA another means of circumventing the mandate of the mandatory minimum sentencing initiative. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at
40-41, United States v. Tolbert, Crim. No. F-4508-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1984), accord
PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL, § 10.41 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL]; Gondelman, D.C Vice.- The Unconstitutionality of MandatoryMinimum Sentencing for Drug Offenses, 10 DISTRICT LAW. 32, 35-

36 (Mar.-Apr. 1986).
115. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1153.
116. Id. at 1154-55. The defendant carries the burden of proving eligibility. Id. at 1155.
117. Id. at 1154.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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linking the defendant's drug habit to the offense.12 °
Significantly, the Grant court held that proof of habitual use of a narcotic
drug at the time of commission of the offense would suffice to satisfy the
requirement of "addiction." 12 ' The court noted that the NARA definition
of "addict," and the definition in the addict exemption, which both derived
from the District of Columbia Dangerous Drug Act, included the "habitual
use" prong.' 2 2 While neither definition required a showing of physical addiction, the court held that under the addict exemption, the burden of proving eligibility was more stringent than under the NARA. 2 3 In contrast to
the NARA and the Dangerous Drug Act, which both evinced intent to expand eligibility for rehabilitative treatment, the addict exemption narrowly
excepted defendants from a punitive mandatory sentencing scheme intended

to limit, not increase, judicial discretion.'

24

The court therefore concluded that the NARA and the addict exception

applied only to offenders who represented good prospects for rehabilitation. 121 However,unlike the NARA, the addict exception placed the burden
of affirmatively proving likelihood of successful rehabilitation entirely upon
the defendant.' 26 In setting forth the prima facie showing required, the
120. Id. A recent reported Superior Court case provides an illustration of the manner in
which the defendant must demonstrate this "linkage," as well as the general type of evidence
which may be used to reach a finding of eligibility. In United States v. Peterkin, 115 Daily
Wash. L. Rep. 2133 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1987), the court, on remand from the Court of
Appeals, found that the defendant was an addict at the time of the offense, but an absence of
any evidence specifically linking the defendant's addiction to the offense for which he was
being sentenced. The court took into account such factors as the defendant's income from
legitimate sources, his drug history, the extent of his drug use, and the daily cost of his drug
habit at the time of the offense. Peterkin, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2137 & n.3. The Peterkin court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether the defendant met the eligibility burden set forth in Grant. Id. at 2137 n.2.
121. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1152; see also United States v. Hart, 488 F.2d 970, 971 n.3. (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Kelley, 476 F.2d 211, 212 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913
(1973).
122. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-602 (1981).
123. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1153.
124. Id. The Grant court, however, noted that the requirement that the offender prove
addiction to narcotics at the time of the offense could be satisfied "even if he is not able to show
physical addiction." Id. at 1152. This represents judicial validation of the "habitual use"
prong of the "addict" definition. See supra notes 81, 64-66, and accompanying text.
125. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1153.
126. Id. The court charged the defendant with the burden of proving eligibility, and admonished the trial court for denying Grant a fair opportunity to demonstrate it. Id. At 1155.
However, whether to hold a full-scale, pre-sentence evidentiary hearing on eligibility was left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and it was recognized that information on a presentence report may disqualify the defendant ab initio. Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-553
(Supp. 1987) (prosecution need not negate availability of exception, burden of proof upon person claiming it).
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court went beyond the face of the addict exemption statute, demanding a
specific proposal for "an alternative sentence which contemplates rehabilitative treatment and [a showing that] the defendant is likely to successfully
complete that treatment." '27 Thus, the Grant court, in defining the circumstances under which judges should impose rehabilitative substitutes for incarceration, incorporated from the NARA another level of inquiry not
present in the text of the addict exemption. The incorporated components
include a showing by the defendant of an available place in a reputable drug
rehabilitation program, and of indications in the defendant's prior history
1 28
and character that he will successfully complete the program.
Banks v. United States 129 demonstrates the rational consistency of these
latter pomponents, which focus on the defendant's prospects for successful
rehabilitation, With the spirit of the addict exemption.1 30 At sentencing, the
trial judge barred the defendant's attempt to proffer evidence of eligibility
under the addict exemption. Although convicted of three counts of distributing cocaine and one count of selling heroin to an undercover officer, the
defendant denied, in the course of trial testimony, selling heroin.'
The
judge reasoned that, because the defendant stated under oath that he did not
sell heroin, he could not meet his addict exemption burden of proving that
1 32
he sold drugs for the primary purpose of supporting his own addiction.
The Court of Appeals found error for two reasons. First, in addition to
the heroin count, the trial judge convicted on three counts of cocaine distribution, which the defendant did not deny at trial. 33 The addict waiver is
available to those convicted of distribution of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance. 134 Secondly, the trial court erroneously concluded that
the fundamental inconsistency between Bank's trial testimony and his addict
waiver showing automatically rendered the defendant ineligible. 135 The
court held that the trial judge should have allowed introduction of eligibility
evidence and considered the defendant's predilection for perjury as only one
factor in assessing his prospects for rehabilitation. 36 The court found this
127. Grant, 509 A.2d at 1154.

128. Id.The defendant in Grant was prepared to show that he had located a place in an
inpatient rehabilitation program primarily to refute the basis for the presentence report's recommendation of incarceration, and its conclusions as to his motives in seeking treatment. Id.
129.

516 A.2d 524 (D.C. 1986).

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.at 531.
Id.at 525.
Id.at 530.
Id.
Id.

135. Id.

136. Id. The court cited United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), in which the
Supreme Court approved the practice of considering a defendant's willingness to give false
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determination particularly critical in light of the emphasis placed on an assessment of the probability of the defendant's future law-abiding behavior in
the controlling Grant case.' 37 Following Grant's approach of importing
NARA precedent, the Banks court cited cases decided under the NARA in
which a defendant's previous denials of addiction did not preclude a separate
1 38
finding of addiction at sentencing.
Following Banks, in Muldrow v. United States,' 39 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals similarly found error in the trial judge's refusal to consider
the defendant's addict exception eligibility because the defendant had stated,
in answer to a routine booking question, that he did not use drugs."4 The
court of appeals concluded that the trial court should have accepted the defendant's addict exception proffer and considered the inconsistency raised by
his prior statement as one factor in assessing his prospects for rehabilitation. 4 ' Citing Banks, the court remanded the case for resentencing, a result
which the prosecution conceded was necessary.42
B.

ConstitutionalDimensions of the Addict Exception

The addict exception establishes classifications, sparing some offenders
from a mandatory prison term required of others convicted of the same
crime. "4 3 For this reason, the exception has provoked numerous constitutional equal protection challenges. These claims have generally focused on
two classifications inherent in the exception. First, the exception distinguishes addicts from nonaddicts. Second, it distinguishes between persons
addicted to narcotic drugs and those addicted to other substances.
testimony as one factor in determining rehabilitative potential for purposes of sentencing. Id.
at 42. In appropriate circumstances, perjury "may be deemed probative of attitudes toward
society and prospects for rehabilitation." Banks, 516 A.2d at 530 (quoting Grayson, 438 U.S.
at 52 (1978)).
137. Banks, 516 A.2d at 531.
138. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Hart, 488 F.2d 970, 971 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Hunter, 485 F.2d 1035, 1036 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It should be noted that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Grant. See Grant v.
United States, 509 A.2d 1147, 1153 n.10 (D.C. 1986).
139. 525 A.2d 1031 (D.C. 1987).
140. Id. at 1032. The arresting officer, apparently in the course of filling out the modus
operandi portion of a PD-163 booking form, asked Muldrow, "What kind of drugs do you
use?" The defendant replied, "I do not use drugs." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1033.
143. See Gondelman, supra note 114, at 32. The addict waiver was available only to those
addicted to narcotic drugs, and thus distinguished on the basis of the drug used. Additionally,
the exception created a classification between convicted distributors who used drugs and those
who did not. The mandatory minimum sentencing scheme itself also established classifications
in the duration of its prescribed prison terms based on the schedule of the drug involved. Id.
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1. Tuzon: The Addict/Nonaddict Classification
In United States v. Tuzon, ' the District of Columbia Superior Court considered an equal protection challenge to the legitimacy of the distinction
made between drug dealers who are addicts and dealers who are not. The
trial court convicted Tuzon of possession of phencyclidine (PCP) with intent
to distribute.14 5 The defendant's substance abuse problem involved PCP,
not a "narcotic" drug, making him ineligible for the addict exception.' 46
The judge first found no fundamental constitutional entitlement on the part
of the defendant to choose what system of penalties the court would apply in
sentencing him.147 This precluded invocation of a strict scrutiny standard of
review.' 48 Thus, the judge framed the equal protection issue as whether the
differential treatment established by the addict waiver
provision bore a ra49
tional relationship to a legitimate state interest.'
In identifying the District of Columbia's interest, the judge stated that the
addict exception reflected a societal judgment "that the actions of a drug
addict are less a product of free will than the actions of others" and that an
addict was therefore less culpable and in greater need of treatment than his
nonaddict counterpart. 5 ° As such, the statutory distinction had a rational
basis, and did not deny the unaddicted dealer equal protection under the
15
law.
2.

Backman: The Court of Appeals Responds to the Initiative's
Conflicting Signals on Eligibility

The exception also distinguished between offenders based upon the nature
of the drug used. The addict exception's language limited its applicability to
144. 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2025 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 1985).
145. Id.
146. Id. "Defendant made no attempt to bring himself within th[e] [addict] exception to
the mandatory minimum provisions of the statute ... the effort would have been fruitless in
any event, since the defendant's drug usage was limited to PCP-a non-narcotic substance."
Id. at 2025 n.4. Tuzon did not base the equal protection challenge on the distinction made
between PCP users and narcotics addicts, but on the grounds that "an addict is not required to
go to jail, while others are." Id. at 2025.
147. Id. at 2028 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
148. Tuzon, 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2028.
149. Id. at 2028 & n. 10. The Tuzon court also considered whether the prosecutor's failure
to file a recidivist information precluded sentencing under the mandatory minimum sentencing
statute, reaching a conclusion in accord with Finney v. United States, 527 A.2d 733, 734-35
(D.C. 1987) and United States v. Mitchell, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 1257, 1262 (D.C. Super.
Ct. May 20, 1986).
150. Tuzon, 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2028.
151. Id.
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offenders who used a narcotic drug.152 The Uniform Controlled Substances
Act defined "narcotic" as opium or a derivative or chemical analogue
thereof.' 53 The District's multi-dimensional drug problem involves a
number of destructive and habit-forming drugs which do not fall within the
narrow definition ascribed to "narcotic" under the UCSA.' 54 This gave rise
to persistent questions as to the ability of nonnarcotic drug abusers to invoke
the addict exception to escape mandatory prison terms.
At sentencing in United States v. Tolbert,1 55 the District of Columbia Superior Court judge explored whether a rational basis existed to distinguish
between cocaine addicts and opiate-derivative addicts for purposes of sentencing under the addict exception."' Although cocaine is not defined as a
"narcotic," the District of Columbia Council classified it as a schedule II
controlled substance under the UCSA because cocaine had a high potential
for abuse which could lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence. 157

The court perceived a fundamental inconsistency between the District of
Columbia Council's recognition of cocaine's addictive properties for purposes of classifying the drug and its disregard of those attributes for purposes
of addict exception eligibility."' 8 The necessary corollary of the principle
that courts should construe criminal statutes narrowly, he said, was that
152. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(24) (1981); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
153. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(15) (1981). The Uniform Controlled Substances Act defines "narcotic" as follows:
"Narcotic drug" means any of the following substances, whether produced directly
or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin or independently by
means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction or chemical synthesis:
(A) Opium, its phenanthrene alkaloids, and their derivatives (except isoquiniline alkaloids of opium).
(B) Any salt, compound, isomer, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances referred to in subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph or;
(C) Opium poppy or poppy straw.
Id.
154. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(24) (1981 & Supp. 1987) with id. § 33-501(15).
The council, in consideration of the UCSA, concluded that cocaine could no longer be considered a narcotic drug in light of a preponderance of medical and scientific opinion. See UCSA
REPORT, supra note 8, at 18 & nn.10-11.
155. Crim. No. F-04508-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1984).
156. Gondelman, supra note 114, at 35. See generally Judges Find Loopholes to Defuse
DistrictSentencing Law's Effect, Wash. Post, May 13, 1986 at A8, col. 1 (case study of James
Tolbert).
157. See UCSA REPORT, supra note 8, at 18 (cocaine placed on schedule II because "it is a
dangerous substance in the nature of a stimulant"). For the criteria for placement of a substance on schedule II, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-515 (Supp. 1987) and supra note 14.
158. See Transcript of Proceedings at 39-40, United States v. Tolbert, Crim. No. F-0450883 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1984).
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courts construe broadly exemptions or exclusions therefrom.' 59 Thus, "to
treat cocaine as a[n addictive] narcotic in one part of the statutory scheme
and to fail to include it in another, where an exemption is concerned, would
.. . result in unequal treatment of the defendants and a denial of equal
protect ion.""16
In the absence of clear legislative guidance, the court would have construed the addict exception's definition of "narcotic" to include cocaine, essentially disregarding the statute as drafted so that it would survive
constitutional scrutiny.' 6 ' Despite this far-ranging discussion of the addict
exemption's constitutionality, however, the judge ultimately avoided deciding the issue by sentencing the defendant under the NARA.' 6 2
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals eventually reached the constitutional issue which the Tolbert court addressed in dicta. However, this
court adopted a more restrained approach. In Backman v. United States,163
159. Id. at 39.
160. Id. at 39-40.
161. Id. at 40. A recent commentator argued that the Tolbert court lacked power to create
a definitional ambiguity where none existed, or to rewrite the statute to avoid constitutional
infirmity. The article suggested that the entire statutory scheme should have been struck
down. Gondelman, supra note 114 (Gondelman represented Tolbert at trial). Anticipating the
1986 amendment, discussed infra at notes 174-79 and accompanying text, he suggested that
the Council reexamine the statute, in order to avoid further "legislation" by the court. Id. at
36.
Gondelman also pointed out another potential constitutional infirmity. Because the
mandatory minimum sentencing statute impinged on the drug offender's fundamental interest
in personal liberty, he argued, any classification it established should have been evaluated according to a strict scrutiny standard of review, under which the distinction would be doomed
to failure. Id. at 34 (citing Boiling v. Manson, 345 F. Supp. 48 (D. Conn. 1972)) (statute
denying "good time" credits to inmate serving indefinite sentence unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny "compelling state interest" test).
Although District of Columbia courts have not squarely confronted the strict scrutiny argument, dicta suggests that it would not succeed. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 115 Daily
Wash. L. Rep. 1821, 1825 n.l (D.C. Super. Ct. July 16, 1987) ("Defendant does not contend,
nor does the Court believe that the right to an individualized sentence is one of the recognized
fundamental rights which would require the Government to show a compelling state interest
to uphold the statute."); accord Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1986)
("[S]ince appellant does not claim that the statute's sentencing provision impinges upon a
fundamental right or involves a suspect class, we can validly presume the statute's
constitutionality.").
162. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Sentencing under the NARA had essentially the same effect as the addict waiver, allowing a judge to substitute drug treatment for
mandatory sentencing. See Gondelman, supra note 114, at 35-36. The power of a Superior
Court judge to sentence under the NARA, derived from an act of Congress, did not change
after the enactment of mandatory minimums by the District of Columbia. Id.; see also 1986
CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 114, § 10.41. The NARA applied a definition of "narcotic" which included cocaine. Gondelman, supra note 114, at 36
n.24; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 820(16), 4251(a) (1982).
163. 516 A.2d 923 (D.C. 1986).
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the court denied alternative sentencing under the addict exception to an offender who claimed an addiction to cocaine. On appeal, Backman challenged the appropriateness of the technical statutory definition of
"narcotic. '' 6" The defendant argued that because the voters adopted the
addict exception measure through the initiative process, the dictionary definition of narcotic which encompassed cocaine better reflected the general
public's understanding of the term "narcotic."'16 5 Backman also advanced a
constitutional equal protection challenge to the distinction made between
66
cocaine abusers and heroin addicts.'
The court held that the voter-approved amendment to the UCSA incorporated that Act's definition of "narcotic." 167 In interpreting the statutory language, the court held the voters who adopted the initiative to the same
standards of definitional construction as it applied to enactments of the legislature. Because they were instructed that the initiative measure amended the
preexisting UCSA, the court assumed that the voters relied on the UCSA
definition as a reference point in amending penalties for drug crime to provide mandatory minimum sentences. Thus, the original language of that
statute controlled. 168 The court refused to hypothesize voter intent to adopt
a generic definition of "narcotic," encompassing cocaine, in place of the
169
UCSA's plain meaning definition.
Turning to the equal protection challenge, the court applied a minimal
scrutiny standard of review and concluded that the voters had a rational
70
basis for excluding cocaine addicts from the sentencing waiver's scope.'
The court noted that, at the time of the exemption's enactment, some medical and research authorities did not consider cocaine pharmacologically addictive. 17' Noting a significant debate among medical researchers as to the
similarity of cocaine's addictive properties to those of narcotics, the court
164. Id. at 925-26. The issue was whether District voters who had adopted the addict
exception by initiative, would be charged with constructive knowledge of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act's definition of "narcotic drug," which excluded cocaine. See supra note
153 and accompanying text.
165. Backman, 516 A.2d at 925-26. The court characterized the defense's argument that
the voters intended a generic definition of "narcotic" instead of the UCSA statutory definition
as "speculation." Id. at 925.
166. Id. at 926. Backman argued that there was no rational basis for distinguishing a cocaine "addict" from a heroin addict. No attempt to invoke a higher constitutional standard of
review was made. Cf supra note 161.
167. Backman, 516 A.2d at 926.
168. Id.; see also Convention Center Referendum Comm. v. Board of Elections and Ethics,
441 A.2d 889, 896-97 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (power of electorate to act by initiative coextensive with the power of the legislature to enact statutes).
169. Backman, 516 A.2d at 926.
170. Id. at 927; cf supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
171. Backman. 516 A.2d at 927.
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observed that the scientific uncertainty provided some rational basis for the
distinctions. 172
IV.

THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO BACKMAN." EXPANDING THE

EXCEPTION:

THE

D.C.

UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

AMENDMENT ACT OF

1986

The court of appeals in Backman declined to expand the definition of
"narcotic" and continued to read the addict exception narrowly, restricting
its benefits to those claiming addiction to narcotic drugs. However, subsequent scientific research revealed the cocaine user's potential for dependency
and compulsive use. 173 Against this backdrop, and the Backman court's reluctance to "legislate" the issue, the District of Columbia Council considered whether to expand eligibility under the addict exception to encompass
cocaine users.
On January 8, 1987, the council enacted legislation extending eligibility
under the addict exception to offenders addicted to "abusive drugs," defined
exclusively as cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), and phenmentrazine
(preludin). 174 Thus, the council amended the statutory definition of "addict" to include users of the "abusive drugs" as well as "narcotic drugs." 175
172. Id. Perhaps the Court felt constrained by its own observation in Grant which represented a reminder of the one clear message of legislative intent in the statute. "[T]he addict
exception ...was enacted as part of a sentencing scheme designed to restrict a judge's sentencing discretion for certain... drug offenses. Nothing in the Act suggests that the addict exception was intended as a loophole for drug users who are also sellers." Grant v. United States,
509 A.2d 1147, 1153 (D.C. 1986).
173. See generally Bozarth & Wise, Toxicity Associated with Long-Term IntravenousHeroin
and Cocaine Self-Administration in the Rat, 254 J. A.M.A. 81 (1985); Johanson, Assessment of
the Dependence Potentialof Cocaine in Animals, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No. 50, at 54 (J. Grabowski, ed. 1984) [hereinafter NIDA COCAINE
MONOGRAPH]; Kleeber & Gawin, The Spectrum of Cocaine Abuse and its Treatment, 45 J.
CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 18 (1984); Pollin, The Dangerof Cocaine, 254 J. A.M.A. 9 (1985); Siegel,
Changing Patterns of Cocaine Use: LongitudinalObservations, Consequences and Treatment, in
NIDA COCAINE MONOGRAPH, supra at 92; Wise, Neural Mechanisms of the Reinforcing Action of Cocaine, NIDA COCAINE MONOGRAPH, supra, at 15.
174. D.C. Act 6-260, District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Amendment
Act of 1986, 34 D.C. Reg. 524 (1987). Councilmember Wilhelmina Rolark introduced the
legislation eight months after the court of appeals decided Backman in direct response to that
case. See MEMORANDUM FROM WILHELMINA ROLARK, CHAIRPERSON, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COUNCIL ON BILL 6-455, THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT OF 1986, at 2-3 (Nov. 5,

1986) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM ON BILL 6-455] (extensive discussion of Backman and its
result).
175. D.C. Act 6-260, § 2(a), (c), 34 D.C. Reg. 524, 525. By adding a new category of
substances to the addict exemption provisions, the Council avoided disturbing existing classifications of drugs, or the statutory definition of "narcotic drug" to accomplish the objective of
expanding eligibility. Id. § 2(b), 34 D.C. Reg. at 524-25.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 37:733

In its statement of purpose and need accompanying the amendment, the
council found many more people addicted to drugs not included under the
current definition of narcotic drug. 176 It observed, "in the District of Columbia, the drug of choice is Phencyclidine. ' ' 177 The council also recognized
the powerful psychologically addictive qualities of cocaine.' 78 The measure,
the council concluded, addressed the hardship faced by those addicted to the
drugs named in the amendment by extending eligibility179for drug treatment
instead of mandatory incarceration to those offenders.
176. MEMORANDUM ON BILL 6-455, supra note 174, at 2.
177. Id. It is highly significant that the Council related prevalence of use of this drug with
eligibility under the addict exemption. It raises the question of whether the offender's degree
of control and the drug's potential for dependency are factors which are significant in determining whether the offender is an "addict." The United States Alcohol, Drug Abuse and
Mental Health Administration recognizes five classes of addicting drugs: narcotic analgesic
opioids (e.g., heroin, morphine, etc.), depressants (e.g., alcohol and barbiturates), stimulants
(e.g., amphetamines and cocaine), hallucinogens (e.g., LSD, PCP, and marijuana), and antianxiety drugs (e.g., meprobamate, diazepam, etc.). All react physiologically in different ways,
but elements of identifiable addictive behavior common to all "are compulsive drug-seeking
behavior... and a decreased anxiety and enhanced feeling of well-being." Letter to the author
from Doris H. Clouet, Ph.D., Neurosciences Research Branch, Division of Preclinical Research, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Sept. 26, 1987).
Of the 11 "addictive" drugs listed above, only narcotics, PCP, and cocaine are encompassed
by the addict waiver. Notably, the UCSA classifies all three drugs addressed in the 1986
amendment as schedule II controlled substances, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-516 (Supp. 1987),
partially in recognition of their high addictive or abusive potential. Id. § 33-515. Unless the
Council's judgments concerning prevalency of abuse of these specific drugs, and associated
public health or safety threats associated with such widespread abuse, see infra note 182, form
the rational basis for the 1986 eligibility expansion amendment, the newly-expanded addict
exception appears vulnerable to an equal protection challenge by a habitual user of another
schedule II drug, such as amphetamine or methaqualone. See supra note 14. Aside from the
immediacy of the public safety and health threat posed by widespread use of cocaine, PCP, and
preludin, there is little to distinguish these drugs from other schedule II substances in terms of
relative potential for abuse and addictive qualities.
178. MEMORANDUM ON BILL 6-455, supra note 174, at 2. See generally Siegel, Changing
Patterns of Cocaine Use: Longitudinal Observations, Consequences and Treatment, NIDA CoCAINE MONOGRAPH, supra note 173, at 108 (escalating patterns of use, including "free base"
cocaine smoking, increase risks of dependency and toxicity; all cocaine smokers in study reported toxic physical and psychological reactions and compulsive abuse); Van Dyke, Cocaine,
246 Sci. AM. 128, 140-41 (1982) ("free-basing," smoking cocaine, likely to lead to compulsive
drug-seeking behavior). Mentions of cocaine use in emergency room visits in the District have
increased 293% since 1982. The District averages six cocaine overdose fatalities a year.
DRUG ABUSE AND CRIME, supra note 7, at 4; Wise, Neural Mechanisms of the Reinforcing
Action of Cocaine, NIDA COCAINE MONOGRAPH, supra note 173 at 15 (cocaine does not
impose reasonable limits on its own intake, has a dangerous tendency to be self-administered to
the user's detriment).
179. MEMORANDUM ON BILL 6-455, supra note 174, at 3.
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V.

DEALING WITH DRUG DEALERS:

THE HIGH PRICE OF

INCONSISTENCY AND LACK OF FORTITUDE IN DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA SENTENCING PHILOSOPHIES

The public's will to punish, deter, and incapacitate drug dealers remains
as strong today as ever.1 8 ° But in a sense, the addict exception itself, and
particularly the 1986 council amendment extending eligibility to habitual
users of cocaine, PCP, and preludin, vindicates the rehabilitative model of
sentencing"I as an effective means of combatting drug crime in appropriate
cases. The amendment may reflect the council's perception that rehabilitation of a habitual user convicted for a first-time distribution offense can
break the cycle of drug crime. Effective rehabilitative treatment of an offender who sold drugs to support his habit reforms both a drug supplier and
consumer, addressing both the supply and demand sides of the drug problem. '8 2 When an individual who presents this possibility comes before the
180. The voters adopted the mandatory minimum sentencing initiative in response to a
perception that the UCSA sentencing scheme was unable to control drug crime. See United
States v. Rogers, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 221, 226 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1986); Statement
of Councilmember John Ray 2 (June 22, 1981) (announcing formation of citizen's committee
for the purpose of drafting mandatory minimum sentencing initiative); News Release from the
Office of Councilmember John Ray (Aug. 6, 1981) (citing news reports of increased heroin use
causing overdose deaths and sharp rise in overall crime rates).
The conditions that led to enactment of the initiative have, if anything, become substantially
worse since the measure was adopted. A recent Rand Corporation study commissioned by a
private-sector task force indicated rampant drug use in the Washington area in all segments of
society. Duke, Suburban Drug Use Here Worst in US., Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1988, at Al, col.
5. Between 1981 and 1986, drug distribution arrests in the District have increased thirteenfold, and prosecutions, convictions, prison commitments, and average minimum sentences
have at least tripled. Id. at A14, col. 1. Police have linked 35 to 54 homicides in the District
of Columbia in the first three months of 1988 to drug trafficking. Harvey, U.S. Bureau Beefs
Up Ranks to Fight Jamaican Racketeers, Wash. Times, Mar. 3, 1988, at B8, col. 5. In addition, the loss of prominent young athletes, such as Len Bias, to the ravages of cocaine, and
shockingly henious crimes committed by those under the influence of PCP, indicate that these
problems persist. See Rogers, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 226. Many officials still view more
effective punishment, including mandatory minimum sentences, as part of the solution. See
Washington, Area's Justice System Teeters Under Weight of Drug Cases, Wash. Times, Mar. 3,
1988, at Al, col. 1.
181. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
182. In defining eligible "addicts," the UCSA refers to individuals "who habitually use[]
any narcotic or abusive drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-501(24) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). The "abusive drugs" identified
in the 1986 Council amendment expanding eligibility include cocaine and PCP, drugs which
pose serious and immediate threats to public health and safety as a function of both their high
level of prevalent abuse, and their inherent physiological dangers. On the public health
hazards of cocaine use, see supra notes 174 and 178. With respect to PCP, authorities report
that PCP overdoses can cause violent reactions, and apparently can cause the user to disregard
pain, making it extremely difficult to subdue users who pose a risk to themselves and others.
DRUG ABUSE AND CRIME, supra note 7, at 26. Significantly, Pretrial Services Agency data
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court for sentencing, insistence on a punitive sentencing model, such as a
mandatory minimum, does not represent an efficient use of society's resources. Evaluating whether a given case affords this opportunity provides
the most appropriate place for judicial discretion within the otherwise incongruous mandatory minimum sentencing scheme.
Notably, this process embodies an individualized evaluation of offender
circumstances and characteristics identical to that which guides the exercise
18 3
of judicial discretion under the rehabilitative sentencing model.'
Mandatory minimum sentences, geared toward making the punishment fit
the crime, not the criminal, mechanically fix prison terms and consciously
avoid consideration of offender characteristics.184 As such, they represent
an extreme reaction to individualized sentencing practices. Yet clearly,
when a judge takes the measure of a guilty defendant seeking rehabilitative
treatment under the addict exception, he engages in a searching scrutiny of
individual characteristics. 8 5
In exercising sentencing discretion under the addict exception, the District
of Columbia courts have consistently followed the lodestar that the exception must be interpreted in light of the restrictive sentencing scheme which
underlies it. It only "opens the discretionary door very slightly to permit the
suggests that PCP users are statistically more likely to be arrested for a violent crime than
either cocaine or heroin users. Id. at 33; see also McCarron, Phencyclidine Intoxication pub-

lished in

PHENCYCLIDINE: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH

MONOGRAPH No. 64, at 209 (1986) [hereinafter PCP MONOGRAPH] (describing physiological

reactions to PCP use as observed in a Los Angeles hospital emergency room, including violent
behavior in fully 35% of patients with PCP intoxication examined on the prison ward of the
hospital). When viewed in light of the public safety consequences of violent crime associated
with cocaine and PCP trafficking, the advantages of "curing" cocaine and PCP user/dealers of
their habits become obvious indeed. See also Gendreau & Ross, Offender Rehabilitation: The
Appeal of Success, 45 FED. PROBATION, 45 (1981) ("antitreatment" movement in sentencing
based on faulty premise: that treatment does not work, however, recent research indicates that
treatment based on concrete behavior modification techniques is effective in offender rehabilitation). The 1988 Rand Corporation report recommends that District of Columbia area officials devote more resources to drug treatment and prevention efforts. Duke, supra note 180, at
A14, col. 5. Intensive enforcement efforts alone, which now account for 75% of drug abatement expenditures, cannot address the problem. Id.
183. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1362. Coffee notes that the process of tailoring individualized sentences to particular offenders primarily occurs through an extensive presentence investigation culminating in a presentence report. Id. at 1370-71. The addict exception eligibility
determination process also emphasizes evaluation of particularized offender characteristics reflected in a presentence report. See infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
184. See Glick, supra note 5, at 5; see also Krup, A Retributive-Justice Model of Sentencing,
45 FED. PROBATION 24, 24-26 (1981).
185. Grant v. United States, 509 A.2d 1147, 1155 (D.C. 1986) (sentencing judge possesses
wide discretion in sources and types of evidence used to decide the type and extent of punishment imposed); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (sentencing judge
may conduct inquiry virtually unlimited in scope, nature, and source of information).
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judge, in sentencing an addict, to waive the mandatory minimums in certain
circumstances."' 6 The 1986 addict exception amendment extends eligibility to users of several of the most prevalently abused drugs in the District of
Columbia.' 87 Logically, the class of prima facie eligible offenders will expand, affording sentencing judges many more opportunities to exercise their
discretion under the addict exception than ever before.
At first blush, it appears that the 1986 council amendment leaves this discretionary door wide open, enhancing the utility of the addict exception as a
device allowing more convicted drug dealers to circumvent the mandate of
the voters for certain incarceration of these offenders. In this connection,
the recent repeal of the NARA, another formerly available' 88 alternative
sentencing device, makes it likely that defendants will more frequently invoke its second cousin, the District of Columbia addict exception. But even
extension of eligibility will not improve the addict exception's function as a
mandatory minimum sentence escape hatch, or, less fortunately, as an effective means of rehabilitating addict/dealers. The reasons for this expose
some fundamental defects in the administration of criminal justice in the
District of Columbia which have contributed to persistent growth in the
blight of drug crime, despite concerted efforts by the courts, council and
enforcement authorities to combat it. Principally, the District of Columbia
lacks the resources and a firm political will to effectively implement either a
punitive sentencing approach to drug crime, represented by mandatory minimum sentences, or a rehabilitative one, aptly exemplified by the District of
Columbia addict exception.
The addict exception's usefulness as a means of escaping a mandatory
prison term pales in comparison with that of plea bargaining at the charging
phase. The potent threat of a mandatory minimum prison term significantly
enhances the prosecutor's bargaining power in these encounters with defendants. 8' 9 In the District, the United States Attorney may offer any of a range
186. Finney v. United States, 527 A.2d 733, 735 (D.C. 1987); Grant, 509 A.2d at 1153.
187. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 114; see also 1986 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL,
supra note 114, § 10.66-.69. The 1987 Trial Manual indicates that the NARA sentencing will

continue to be available for offenders arrested before November 1, 1987, the effective date of
the NARA repeal. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL § 10.69
(1987) [hereinafter 1987 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL]. It suggests that
defendants unable to meet the difficult burden under the addict exception should attempt to
invoke the NARA. Id.
189. See generally United States v. Rogers, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 221, 226 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1986) (plea bargaining strategems tend to thwart the expressed will of the electorate for mandatory sentences); Washington, supra note 180, at A10, col. 1; Bruske, Plea Bargains Erode Drug Law's Intent, Wash. Post, May 12, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
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of lesser offenses which do not carry mandatory minimums to obtain a con-

cession of guilt. The UCSA itself contains a provision permitting the prosecutor, "if the interests of justice so require," to charge distribution or
possession with intent to distribute, which may carry mandatory minimums,
as simple possession, a misdemeanor.' 9 0 In addition, the prosecutor may
allow a defendant charged with distribution or possession with intent to distribute to plead guilty to an attempt or conspiracy to commit those offenses,
felonies which do not carry a mandatory minimum.19 Moreover, extremely
pressing case management demands create a powerful incentive for prosecutors to exercise charging discretion in this manner. As pointed out during
initial debate on mandatory minimum sentencing, if the prosecutor sought
the mandatory penalty in every case, defendants would have nothing to lose
by proceeding to trial. Coupled with drug case volume generated by enforcement techniques such as "Operation Clean Sweep,"' 9 2 such a result
quickly would dissipate the resources of Superior Court. A critical shortage
of prison capacity 9 ' provides further incentive for judicial and prosecutorial
officials to actively plea bargain. Thus, it best behooves the defendant to
concentrate efforts to avoid mandatory sentences upon the prosecutor, not
the judge.
Reduced reliance on plea bargaining in favor of effectuation of the voters'
mandate for strict mandatory minimum sentencing would require a far
greater outlay of public resources for courts and prisons than the public ap190. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(F) (Supp. 1987).

191.

1987

CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL,

supra note 188, at § 10.50-

.51. District of Columbia judges have displayed mixed reactions to these devices. See Rogers,
115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 226. Judge Schwelb, in Rogers, engaged in an insightful and
probing analysis of the propriety of allowing prosecutors to circumvent the mandate for fixed
sentences by charging distribution as an attempt or conspiracy, reluctantly concluding that he
was:
[O]bliged to accept the tendered pleas. The prosecutor traditionally has the prerogative to select the charge for which a defendant is to be prosecuted and to determine
the offense to which he will be permitted to plead guilty. The Court's authority to
second guess him in areas confided to prosecutorial discretion is quite limited and
must be exercised with restraint. For the Court to rule that the prosecutor's negotiation of an attempted distribution plea constitutes so grave an abuse of discretion that
the Court should intervene would be strong medicine indeed, and the circumstances
do not warrant such action here.... Nevertheless, the Court apprehends that the
strategem which it here deems itself constrained to approve tends to thwart the expressed will of the electorate.
Id.

192. See

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

42 (1986) (aggressive drug

enforcement techniques, such as "Clean Sweep" responsible for increased caseload); Washington, supra note 180, at AI0, col. 2 ("[I]n 1982, drug-related cases accounted for 21% of felony
indictments. In 1987, that number jumped to 61.3%.").
193. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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pears willing to provide. 9 4 Similarly, the exception's purpose of providing
opportunities for rehabilitation to deserving offenders cannot be implemented without a large increase in capacity of public drug treatment facilities.' 9"5 Grant requires that the defendant seeking sentencing under the
addict exception locate and obtain a placement in a suitable rehabilitation
program, by the time of sentencing. A suitable rehabilitation program generally is understood to mean one at a residential facility. Significantly, the
courts refer 58% of the District of Columbia Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Administration's (ADASA) clients for drug treatment.' 96 In February
1988, there were 1,304 people waiting to enter District of Columbia public
drug treatment facilities, far outstripping their capacity. 97 Those seeking
ADASA treatment must wait up to six weeks for an initial screening appointment.198 The indigent defendant seeking a slot in a drug rehabilitation
program by the time of sentencing faces a formidable challenge in the
District.
Finally, the courts themselves have restricted the utility of the addict exception by requiring the defendant to carry a heavy and detailed burden,
making the exception applicable to a narrow class of defendants. To summarize, the statute requires that the defendant have no prior convictions for
distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute drugs included in schedule I, II, or III in any jurisdiction, that he
habitually used a narcotic or abusive drug at the time of the offense, and that
he sold drugs primarily to support that habit.' 99 Upon this foundation,
Grant requires that the defendant further show that nothing in his prior history suggests that he will not successfully complete rehabilitative treatment,
and that he has located a place in a suitable rehabilitation program.2 °°
The importation by the Grant court of key aspects of the NARA, a well194. See Specter, Waitingfor the New D.C. Prison, Wash. Post, Oct. It, 1987, at H8, col. 7;
see also supra note 7.
195. See, e.g., Boyle, Clinics Try to Stop the Revolving Door, Wash. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at
Al, col. 1; Bruske, Drug Treatment Shortage Keeps Addicts in Jail,Wash. Post, May 14, 1986,
at Al, col. 2. District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry's proposed 1989 budget has come
under criticism for failing to meet the need for increased treatment and prevention facilities.
See Council Members Find Drug Response Inadequate, Wash. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at B4, col.

1. Criminal justice system observers also have called for greater emphasis on rehabilitative
treatment. See Clardy, Regional Summit Sought in Drug Fight, Wash. Times, Mar. 3, 1988, at
BI, col. 1, B8, col. 1; Washington, supra note 180, at A10, col. 6; Duke, supra note 180, at
A14, col. 1.
196. Abramowitz, Concern Mounts Over Lengthy Wait for Drug Treatment in D.C., Wash.
Post, Feb. 21, 1988, at Cl, col. 2.

197. Id. at Cl, col. 2.
198. Id.
199. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(2) (Supp. 1987).
200. Grant v. United States, 509 A.2d 1147, 1153-54 (D.C. 1986).
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established alternative sentencing statute, provided judges with a substantial
body of case law to guide eligibility determinations under the District of
Columbia addict exception. 2°" This prevents unfettered exercises of judicial
discretion in this area and to some extent assures consistency in procedures
and results. In reaching the findings identified in the statute, as interpreted
by Grant, the presentence report, prepared by the probation officer assigned
to the case, supplies the trial judge with an important source of objective
evidence.2 °2 It may conclusively establish ineligibility and foreclose a judge
from exercising his discretion to use the addict exception. The report contains the results of post-arrest drug testing, which may reveal the use of
narcotic or commonly abused drugs, satisfying an essential eligibility criterion.2 °3 The presentence report also contains information on prior convictions, and may thus establish the existence of a prior disqualifying offense, as
well as a pattern of criminal behavior showing that the defendant is an unlikely candidate for successful rehabilitation. The report reveals background
details on the offender's domestic life, evidence also probative on the issue of
likelihood of successful rehabilitation, and includes recommendations for
sentencing. 2° Judges rely heavily on presentence reports in sentencing. For
example, whether the defendant is entitled to an opportunity to rebut matters set forth in the presentence report lies essentially within the sentencing
201. Id. at 1152-53. The Grant court analogized federal cases interpreting the NARA in
setting forth the defendant's initial burden of showing eligibility under the addict exception.
Id. at 1152; e.g., United States v. Stalnaker, 544 F.2d 725, 729 (4th Cir. 1976) cited in Grant,
509 A.2d at 1152 n.6 (defendant must show that a substantial motivation for drug trafficking
was his own habit); United States v. Hart, 488 F.2d 970, 971 n.3 (5th cir. 1974), cited in Grant,
509 A.2d at 1152-53 n.8 (defendant need not show actual physical addiction, proof of habitual
use sufficient); accord United States v. Kelley, 476 F.2d 211, 212 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 913 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 373 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (D. Del. 1974), cited in
Grant, 509 A.2d at 1152 n.5 (the defendant must advise the court that he seeks alternative
rehabilitative treatment in lieu of incarceration).
202. Unless waived by the defendant, or precluded by the judge upon a finding that sufficient information exists to sentence the defendant, in every criminal case prosecuted in the
District of Columbia for which a finding or plea of guilty has been entered, except traffic
offenses, the probation service conducts an investigation and prepares a presentence report to
assist the judge in exercising sentencing discretion. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(b). The
presentence report contains the "prior criminal record of the defendant, and such information
about his characteristics, financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as
may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment
of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the Court." Id. at
32(b)(2).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Peterkin, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2136, 2137 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 18, 1987). The District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency tests all arrestees held
for major crimes to detect the use of various drugs, including heroin, cocaine, and PCP. DRUG
ABUSE AND CRIME, supra note 7, at 14, 17.
204. See, e.g., Grant, 509 A.2d at 1154-55.
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judge's discretion.2"' Even if the presentence report contradicts the defendant's prima facie proffer of eligibility proof made in the proposal advising the
judge of a desire to seek sentencing under the addict exception, 20 6 the judge
may deny the defendant an opportunity to present further evidence, and re20 7
solve the conflict by ordering a supplemental presentence report.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The defendant seeking to establish addict exception eligibility must run a
difficult procedural and substantive gauntlet. The courts have clearly expressed an intention to pay heed to the voters' call for fixed sentencing of
drug dealers, and this consideration permeates addict exception case law.
This attitude of self-restraint obviates the possibility that expanded eligibility
will improve the utility of the addict exception as a mandatory minimum
sentence loophole. But the eligibility ordeal also stems from inadequate fiscal emphasis on public rehabilitative treatment facilities. The current restrictively finite number of spaces in such facilities represents the outer limit
of the addict exception's utility as a device to combat drug crime. In sum,
the Council's gesture in extending eligibility means little unless it also increases its fiscal commitment to rehabilitation. In the same vein, a strategy
combining vigorous enforcement with mandatory sentencing cannot work
without an increase in the capacity of judicial and corrections resources to
accommodate those subject to fixed terms of incarceration. While courts
and politicians indecisively experiment with two conflicting statutory sentencing philosophies, firmly committed to neither, the community suffers at
the hands of drug dealers. The city desperately needs movement on a comprehensive reevaluation of the unique dynamics of felony drug sentencing,
including a fundamental decision as to its purpose, by officials willing to
20 8
stand by their decision.
Benjamin J. Lambiotte
205. Id. at 1154. In Grant, the court remanded the case to afford the defendant an oppor-

tunity to rebut the presentence report's recommendation of incarceration, which seems to suggest that the defendant making an addict exception showing may present rebuttal evidence as
of right. Id. However, the court stated that whether to allow a hearing for presentation of

such evidence lies within the discretion of the trial judge. Id. The court noted: "a hearing
may be unnecessary where the trial judge finds reliable information in the presentence report of
a defendant's ineligibility or his unlikely prosepects for rehabilitation, not withstanding any of
the defendant's challenges to the report." Id. at 1155.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1156.

208. Movement on sentencing reform has occurred through the initiative of a commission
composed of judges and District of Columbia legislators. As a means of assuring greater order

in sentencing offenders not subject to mandatory minimums, the Sentencing Guidelines Com-
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mission formulated and is currently studying a system of fixed terms of incarceration for certain drug offenses. See SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, INITIAL
REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, (Feb. 1987). In accordance with the Commission's
general guidelines-based approach, a drug "sentencing matrix," or grid identifies presumptive
sentences. Id. at 16-23. The horizontal axis defines certain defendant characteristics and circumstances surrounding the violation. The vertical axis groups drugs involved into three categories, "narcotic drugs, PCP and all other drugs." Depending on the drug involved, the
nature of the offense and defendant characteristics, "cells" on the grid identify a prescribed
sentencing range. Id. Nonaddict dealers subject to the mandatory minimum prison terms are
not covered by the guidelines. Under guideline sentencing, the judge must adhere to the guideline sentence range provided in the appropriate grid cell, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for departure. Id. at 27-29. This is intended to be a strict standard, but the list
of aggravating/mitigating factors justifying deviation is extensive. Id. at 88. In such cases, the
judge must set forth reasons for departure on the record. Id. at 29.
Significantly, the grid prescribes sentences for addict sellers, according to the offender's
prospects for rehabilitation, extent of criminal record, and potential threats of violent or
threatening behavior. Id. at 82. Cell A provides probation with mandatory drug treatment for
those with a minor prior record showing no violent crimes adjudged amenable to rehabilitation, regardless of the drug involved. Id. Cell B prescribes incarceration for an addict seller
who either presents a poor prospect for treatment, or presents an unacceptable risk to the
safety of persons or property. Id. The grid prescribes a 24 month presumptive term for dealers of narcotics of PCP in this category, and 20 months when other drugs are involved. Id.
Finally, cell C provides 36 months for an addict with an extensive criminal history or a prior
violent crime conviction, when convicted of selling narcotics or PCP, and 20 months for other
drugs. Id. Addict offenders ineligible for drug treatment with less serious records are subject
to prison terms less than the mandatory minimum, and would be eligible for "good time"
credits. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-428 to -429 (Supp. 1987); SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION,

supra, at 82; see also id. at x (Council Bill 6-505 deducts "good

time" credits from both minimum and maximum terms of indeterminate sentence, changes
Commission's assumption that offender will serve full guideline sentence imposed).
The Guidelines Commission's work is now undergoing a period of comment and review
leading to adoption on a trial basis. Id. at xi. The future is, however, clouded by a strong
minority view that the majority has inadequately considered the potential impact of proposed
guidelines upon prison population and expenses. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION
MINORITY REPORT 2-7 (Feb. 6, 1987) (printed in same volume as the majority report). Notably, both Council Chairman David Clarke, opponent of mandatory minimums during Council
deliberations, and Chairperson of the Committee on the Judiciary Wilhelmina Rolark, sponsor
of the addict exemption expansion amendment, joined in this dissent. Id. at 8. Ironically,
mandatory minimum sentencing, a much more inflexible sentencing scheme than guidelines,
was thrust upon the criminal justice system without the benefit of careful deliberation on these
critical matters.

